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Two years after the Revolution of Dignity, Odessa Oblast, one of Ukraine’s key regions in 
economic and political terms, is still strongly polarised as regards its residents’ views on the 
future of their country. The political circles rooted in the Party of Regions have maintained 
their influence to a great extent due to increasing dissatisfaction with the central govern-
ment’s activity and with the economic crisis which has strongly affected the public. Politicians 
linked to the ancien régime remain the most important political players. Some pro-Ukrainian 
circles had pinned their hopes for change in the region on the nomination of the former Geo-
rgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, for governor of Odessa Oblast on 30 May 2015. At the 
beginning of his rule this politician made widely publicised promises to combat corruption, 
to improve the quality of the administration services, to develop infrastructure and to attract 
foreign capital. However, more than half a year has passed since he assumed office, and it 
is difficult to speak about any spectacular successes in reforming the region. Saakashvili has 
above all become a player on the national forum, supporting the presidential camp in their 
struggle with Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and the oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi, among 
others. However, his nomination has made Odessa Oblast more important for Ukraine, above 
all in political and symbolic terms. This is because Odessa Oblast is the best manifestation of 
the condition of the Ukrainian state two years since the Revolution of Dignity – rudimentary 
reforms or no reforms at all, strong resistance to any changes from the administration, strong 
local political-business connections, the lack of consolidation among post-Maidan groups and 
corruption inherent in the system. 
Diversity the Odessa way
Odessa Oblast is Ukraine’s largest region in 
terms of territory and has the fifth highest pop-
ulation – 2.4 million people live there, more 
than one million in the city of Odessa. Its nu-
merous ethnic minorities are one of the things 
which characterise it; Ukrainians account for 
only 62.8% of its population. Russians form 
the largest minority, accounting for 20.7% 
of dwellers. Most of them live in Odessa (29% 
of the residents of the city). They are followed 
by Bulgarians (10% of the region’s population 
and Moldovans (5%)1. At the same time, Russian 
is one of the main languages used in the region 
– according to the census conducted in 2001, 
42% of the population of the oblast declared 
that Russian was their native tongue. 
The region is relatively strongly industrialised 
on the scale of the country. The region’s key 
branches are the chemical, the machine-build-
ing and the food industries. While in 2014 com-
panies located in Odessa Oblast were not seri-
ously affected by the Ukrainian economic crisis 
(production dropped only minimally, by 0.5%, 
1 Data as in the Ukrainian national census of 2001: http://
ukrcensus.gov.ua
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with the average nationwide production de-
crease rate being 10.1%), in 2015 production 
in the region was reduced more noticeably 
(as compared to the previous year, in 2015, 
production dropped by 4.4%2, the average na-
tionwide production decrease rate was 13.4%3). 
At the same time, according to data for Janu-
ary-November 2015, as a consequence of the 
radical decrease in the national trade volume 
(above all with Russia)4 the position of Odessa 
Oblast in Ukrainian exports has strengthened, 
since it has access to ports, even though sales 
of goods from this region dropped by 1.5%. 
At present, the region accounts for 4.6% of 
Ukrainian exports (US$1.57 billion). At the same 
time, Odessa Oblast saw the second largest de-
cline in imports (after Luhansk oblast) on the 
scale of the country as a whole (by 51.8% or 
US$989 million between January and Novem-
ber 2015 as compared to the preceding year).
The strong industrialisation of the region con-
tributed to a significant inflow of Russian pop-
ulation in the Soviet times, as well as to its 
historical roots5, and has led to the region re-
maining under the strong influence of pro-Rus-
sian circles following Ukraine’s independence. 
 
2 Data quoted from the Statistical Service of Odes-
sa Oblast: http://www.od.ukrstat.gov.ua/arh/prom/
prom1_12_2015.htm
3 http://ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2014/pr/ipp/ip-
p_u/ipp_u14.htm
4 Between January and November 2015, Ukrainian ex-
ports fell by 30.9% and imports by 31.2% year-on-year; 
data quoted from the National Statistical Service of 
Ukraine: http://ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2015/zd/
oet/oet_u/oet1115_u.htm
5 It became part of the Russian Empire in 1792 under the 
Treaty of Jassy which marked the end of the Turkish-Rus-
sian war in 1787–1792. The rapid development of these 
lands began at the time of the Russian colonisation. 
Parties or candidates linked to political options 
favourably disposed towards Moscow would as 
a rule win elections there. Thus, when Russia 
attempted to provoke separatist sentiments in 
south-eastern Ukraine after the victory of the 
Revolution of Dignity, there was real concern as 
to whether the situation in the region would re-
main stable. The local anti-Maidan movement 
was well-organised and could count on sup-
port from local interest groups. Unrest reached 
its peak on 2 May 2014, when riots were seen 
in the city6. Dozens of people died then, most 
of whom were representatives of anti-Maidan, 
who were trapped in the local trade unions 
building that was set on fire. This tragedy 
came as a shock to the city and, paradoxical-
ly, contributed to damping down unrest and 
consolidated the local population, who want-
ed peace and stability to be preserved in the 
region. These tendencies gained strength as 
the conflict in Donbas developed and gradually 
escalated, ultimately leading large sections of 
Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to economic and 
social decay7.
Public sentiment
However, social divides in the region remain 
visible. According to the most recent available 
public opinion polls from March 2015, Odessa 
Oblast was among the three Ukrainian regions 
where the public was very strongly divided over 
6 On 2 May 2014, fans of two football clubs with friend-
ly ties, Chornomorets Odessa and Metalist Kharkiv, or-
ganised a common march before a match played by the 
two teams in the Ukrainian Premier League. Their march 
to the stadium was disrupted by an attack launched by 
pro-Russian activists. This led to riots on a massive scale, 
where firearms were used. For more on the riots, see the 
report prepared by the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR): 
 http://web.archive.org/web/20140620085642/http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/HRMMURe-
port15June2014.pdf
7 Fore more information, see: Tomasz Piechal, The War re-
publics in the Donbas one year after the outbreak of the 
conflict, OSW Commentary, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-06-17/war-republics-
donbas-one-year-after-outbreak-conflict
Odessa Oblast has remained under the 
strong influence of pro-Russian circles 
following Ukraine’s independence. 
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which integration projects Ukraine should take 
part in. 30% of resident support the EU but 25% 
of respondents (the largest percentage in the 
country) wanted Ukraine to integrate with the 
structures promoted by Moscow (the Customs 
Union, which was later transformed into the 
Eurasian Economic Union)8. At the same time, 
Odessa Oblast has had one of the highest levels 
of public dissatisfaction with the central gov-
ernment’s activity, and the tendency towards 
disillusionment with Kyiv’s moves is strength-
ening. Already in March 2015, Petro Poroshen-
ko’s work was evaluated positively by only 17% 
of respondents, while only 10% of the region’s 
residents had a positive opinion about the gov-
ernment led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk and the par-
liament9. Dissatisfaction with the government 
in Kyiv also contributes to high public support 
levels in the region for politicians who have had 
links to the Party of Regions. One example of 
this was seen in the local election in October 
2015 where several political projects (including 
the Opposition Bloc, Our Land or the party led 
by the mayor of Odessa, Trust in Deeds) formed 
predominantly by veterans of the Party of Re-
gions were successful. 
Pro-Ukrainian symbolism predominates in the 
region’s political landscape – numerous national 
flags are hoisted, and elements in public space 
(bus stops, streetlights etc.) have been paint-
ed in the Ukrainian national colours. However, 
8 Data quoted from the survey conducted by Rating re-
search group ordered by IRI on 2–20 March 2015: http://
www.iri.org/resource/first-ever-iri-ukraine-national-mu-
nicipal-poll-ukrainians-deeply-concerned-over-corruption
9 No survey of public sentiments specifically in Odessa 
Oblast has been conducted since March 2015. However, 
considering the falling support levels for the president’s 
and the prime minister’s actions all over Ukraine, it 
should be assumed that their current popularity ratings 
are even lower. 
this visual predominance of the pro-Ukrainian 
moods does not mean that the views of the 
region’s residents have changed significantly. 
The lack of visible actions coordinated by organ-
isations which support pro-Russian or pro-sep-
aratist ideas is to a great extent an effect of the 
fact that the public does not want the situation 
in the region to become destabilised, and also 
of operational counteraction by the Security 
Service of Ukraine10. 
Pro-Russian groups became somewhat more 
active only at the beginning of November 2015, 
when the critical report on the investigation 
into the 2 May tragedy was published by the 
Council of Europe11. However, even then their 
manifestations were marginal in nature and did 
not have any major impact on the situation in 
the city. The acts of sabotage seen over the past 
year or so might have been provoked presuma-
bly by Russian secret services and they have not 
led to a radicalisation of public mood or a dest-
abilisation of the region’s life, either12. Small 
explosives planted near offices of the state ad-
ministration and of organisations offering aid 
to Ukrainian soldiers did not result in civilian 
casualties and made only minimum impact on 
life in the region. These terrorist attacks were 
thus political actions (aimed and demonstrat-
ing the presence of forces which are opposed 
to the government in the region) rather than 
real diversionary and destabilising acts. The sit-
uation on the frontier between Odessa Oblast 
and the unrecognised breakaway republic 
of Transnistria has also calmed down.
10 The Security Service of Ukraine regularly detains groups 
of saboteurs and also individuals accused of fomenting 
separatist sentiments in the region. In effect, most lead-
ers of pro-Russian organisations have been excluded 
from public life. 
11 The Council of Europe criticised the operation of 
the Ukrainian investigation authorities, since it had 
found numerous omissions in the investigation and 
no motivation from the Ukrainian side to clear up this 
matter fully: https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCom-
monSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documen-
tId=090000168048851b
12 Saboteurs trained and coordinated by the Russian secret 
services were allegedly responsible for the big explo-
sion near the building of the Security Service of Ukraine 
in Odessa in late September 2015: http://tyzhden.ua/
News/149219
Dissatisfaction with the government in 
Kyiv contributes to high public support 
levels in the region for politicians who 
have had links to the Party of Regions.
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The political scene in Odessa
One characteristic of the political scene in Odes-
sa is the presence of a large number of strong 
local deals which have been built for years and 
most of which originated in the gangster pe-
riod of the 1990s13. Despite the victory of the 
Revolution of Dignity, the region’s political life 
is still strongly affected by the connections 
existing between local politicians, organised 
criminal groups and oligarchs from other parts 
of the country. Gennadiy Trukhanov, who has 
served as the mayor of Odessa since May 2014 
and who has strong links with the local criminal 
underworld, has become the main representa-
tive of the interests of ‘old deals’14. With a sup-
port level of 51.3% he won the local election 
in October 2015 without the need for a run-
off. Furthermore, his political project, Trust in 
Deeds, which was formed for the needs of the 
election, won the election to the City Hall and 
achieved the second best result in the election 
to the Oblast Council. He had been a member 
of the Party of Regions for many years, and 
therefore he could count on support from the 
Opposition Bloc. Furthermore, the city adminis-
tration also worked for its support. Other major 
players in Odessa Oblast are: Serhiy Kivalov (the 
former head of the Central Election Committee 
responsible for fixing the presidential election 
in 2004) and the Dnipropetrovsk-based oli-
garch Ihor Kolomoyskyi, who has a interests in 
this region15. Kolomoyskyi, who co-owns Privat 
13 For more information on the operation of mafia in the 
1990s in Odessa see: http://www.segodnya.ua/regions/
odessa/avtoritetnyj-karabac-c-odecckoho-privoza.html
14 Trukhanov’s name was frequently mentioned in the 
evidence concerning the investigation conducted by 
Western services for combating organised crime, where 
he was mentioned as one of the members of an inter-
national network of weapons traders (https://www.
reportingproject.net/peopleofinterest/Ukrainian_Ma-
fia_Report.pdf). It is an open secret that in the 1990’s 
Trukhanov was the personal bodyguard of the local ma-
fia boss, Aleksander Argent (nicknamed Angel). It is cur-
rently believed that Trukhanov remains one of his closest 
business partners. 
15 The key asset of Privat Group in the region is an oil 
reloading facility in Odessa port. The oligarch owns 
a terminal in the Port of Yuzhne, and controls the port 
in Illichivsk.
Group, was represented by Ihor Palytsa, who 
served as the governor of Odessa Oblast be-
tween May 2014 and May 2015, and who devot-
ed a great deal of his activity to protecting and 
possibly expanding his protector’s business. 
At present, Gennadiy Trukhanov is Kolomoys-
kyi’s main partner in the region16.
Given the organisational failure of the circles 
centred around local Euromaidan activists, the 
main alternative to the old deals during the lo-
cal election last October was offered by Olek-
sandr Borovyk, advisor to Governor Saakashvili. 
As a candidate representing the Petro Poro-
shenko Bloc (PPB), he unexpectedly garnered 
a 24.6% support level. A result this high – giv-
en the fact that he launched his campaign very 
late and was not a well-recognised politician 
– should be treated as a real indicator of sup-
port from Odessa’s residents for the activity 
of the person he directly reports to – Mikheil 
Saakashvili. Those who voted for the PPB’s can-
didate were above all the pro-Ukrainian sec-
tion of the electorate who also supported the 
former mayor of Odessa and the former UDAR 
deputy, Eduard Gurvits. The aggregate sup-
port level for the two candidates was 32.9%, 
and this may be recognised as an adequate in-
dicator of the proportion of people who sup-
port the pro-reform and pro-European path 
of Ukraine’s development. 
The election has proven that the people who 
had for years been linked to the Party of Re-
gions are still the most important politicians 
16 One proof for this thesis is the fact that neither of Kolo-
moyskyi’s political projects (the Ukrop and Revival par-
ties) put forward a strong counter-candidate against 
Trukhanov in the local election last October, and the Kol-
omoyskyi himself has spoken positively about Trukhanov 
on many occasions in the media. 
Gennadiy Trukhanov, the mayor of Odes-
sa, has strong links with the local criminal 
underworld. He has become the main rep-
resentative of the interests of ‘old deals’. 
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in Odessa and the region as a whole. The po-
litical projects in which they have played ma-
jor roles achieved large successes in elections 
to the Oblast Council and the City Hall. At the 
same time, serious differences inside the local 
structures of Petro Poroshenko Bloc became 
evident. A part of them is formed by former 
members of the Party of Regions, who decid-
ed to support Trukhanov rather than their own 
candidate during the election campaign. In ex-
change for alliances and appointments in the 
City Hall and the Oblast Council local PPB struc-
tures led by Oleksiy Honcharenko took action 
to undermine Oleksandr Borovyk’s position and 
once again demonstrated their lack of solidari-
ty with Saakashvili’s group. This casts doubt on 
Saakashvili’s position in the grouping he rep-
resents. Since even his own political base acts 
against him and forms alliances with represent-
atives of the ‘old system’, the question arises, 
to what extent, realistically, Saakashvili is able 
to change the situation in the region. 
Saakashvili – a lot of words, few changes
It is difficult to say that the situation has clearly 
improved in the region more than half a year 
since Mikheil Saakashvili was nominated as gov-
ernor. The main tasks the new governor took 
up included: combating smuggling and corrup-
tion in the region (especially in the context of 
ports), the development of road infrastructure 
in the oblast (one of the worst in the country), 
improving the work of local administration and 
attracting foreign investors. However, his rule 
was expected above all to show a new quali-
ty in governance and make Odessa Oblast an 
example of change to be followed by the rest 
of Ukraine. 
His work so far has failed to bring any spec-
tacular successes in any of the priority areas 
of activity. However, remedial actions have 
been taken in each of the areas. The greatest 
changes were made inside the Oblast State 
Administration (OSA): half of the civil servants 
were made redundant17, and the decision was 
made to reduce the number of departments 
from 27 to 13. However, local experts have 
negatively evaluated this change, arguing that 
part of the liquidated departments were of 
key significance for the region18. In October 
2015, a Service Centre was opened at the OSA. 
As in Georgia, it is expected to be a place where 
residents of the region can quickly and effec-
tively handle all administrational issues. Com-
bating corruption is still on the micro level – its 
rather focused on people at the lowest and me-
dium levels. Smuggling from Transnistria has 
to a certain extent been reduced. At the same 
time, the infrastructure projects (above all the 
construction of the road running from Odessa 
to Romania), which are of key importance from 
citizens’ point of view, are still in the prepara-
tion stages, although the governor has already 
managed to find part of the funds necessary to 
implement the projects. 
From the point of view of Odessa, the key area 
where Saakashvili needed to make changes 
was in improving the situation in the oblast’s 
ports. When he was taking office, these were 
places where the greatest chaos reigned – the 
enitre senior staff of Odessa’s customs service 
has been replaced several times over a year or 
so. However, these changes were superficial. 
17 When Saakashvili was taking the office, around 800 
people worked for the Oblast State Administration. 
Its present employment level is around 400. 
18 For example, the agrarian policy department was liqui-
dated, while agriculture is one of the most important 
branches of the region’s economy. Similar observations 
concern the liquidation of the department for foreign 
co-operation and European integration.
It is difficult to say that the situation has 
clearly improved in the region more than 
half a year since Saakashvili was nomi-
nated as governor.
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The new heads of the customs office contin-
ued the practices of their predecessors. In ef-
fect, new reports about corruption there were 
continuously received. At the same time, as 
a result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the 
ports located in the oblast have become the 
main centres of Ukraine’s maritime transport19. 
In 2015 alone, 91.45 million tonnes of goods 
were reloaded in the so-called ‘great Odessa’ 
ports (in 2014 and 2015, the increase was by 
7.9% and 2%), which accounted for 63.1% of 
goods reloaded in all Ukrainian ports20. How-
ever, as the reloading level increased, more 
room for scope for corruption has been cre-
ated. Improving supervision over the oblast’s 
ports thus became one of Saakashvili’s tasks. 
For example, the nomination of the governor’s 
close aide, Yulia Marushevska, who is 26, as the 
head of the local customs office was expected 
to help him achieve that. After several months 
of struggle for her nomination, this was accom-
plished last October. According to Saakashvili’s 
declaration, the simplification of a number of 
procedures (setting adequate customs duty 
rates and streamlining the customs clearance 
process) has led to the elimination of several 
corruption-generating loopholes in the system. 
However, successes in this area have met with 
strong resistance from the local medium- and 
lower-level customs service apparatus as well 
as central government authorities (the National 
Fiscal Service), many of whose officers benefit 
from corruption.
19 At present, eight of the fifteen maritime ports controlled 
by the Ukrainian government are located in Odessa 
Oblast, including the three largest ones – in Odessa, 
Yuzhne and Illichivsk. 
20 Based on my own calculations using data from the Ad-
ministration of the Maritime Ports of Ukraine. 
Therefore, it still cannot be said that the re-
gion’s reform has been successful. Further-
more, Saakashvili himself is giving rise to more 
and more doubt – for example, the fact that 
the promotion of his activity as a governor was 
to some extent financed by local businessmen, 
who pay funds to the ‘For the Benefit of Odessa’ 
fund has provoked numerous controversies21. 
In addition to this, when Borovyk lost the elec-
tion Saakashvili reportedly withdrew from ac-
tivity in Odessa itself. Saakashvili’s main excuse 
for the lack of real and tangible successes is 
that most of his promises and declared actions 
require real support from the central govern-
ment and all state institutions. Meanwhile, he 
regularly complains about problems in co-op-
eration with the government and Kyiv, which 
impedes the implementation of his plans22. 
By doing this – considering his limited powers, 
capabilities and the lack of a strong political 
base in the region itself – Saakashvili is trying to 
build his position above all on the national and 
not the local political forum. One of the main 
examples of this behaviour is the actions he has 
taken – in both rhetorical and practical terms – 
against Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and 
his political base. Such behaviour needs to be 
viewed not only as an element of the political 
game inside the government coalition (weak-
ening Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s position in order to 
strengthen the presidential camp) but also as 
an attempt to shrug off responsibility for his 
own lack of successes. Furthermore, his open 
and aggressive criticism of the unpopular prime 
minister both allows Saakashvili to build his 
own image as the main anti-corruption fighter 
and also lays the foundation for his own po-
21 The Fund for the Benefit of Odessa was established 
by local businessmen in May 2014. After Saakashvili’s 
nomination, his close aide, Teymuraz Nishnianidze, was 
appointed its head. Many influential regional entrepre-
neurs have made contributions to this fund. For more 
information see: http://nashigroshi.org/2015/12/04/
sponsory-saakashvili/
22 Mikheil Saakashvili’s interview for Channel 5 (a TV news 
channel, one of President Poroshenko’s assets) in which 
he openly accused Prime Minister Yatsenyuk of promot-
ing the interests of oligarchs, reverberated widely. http://
www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2015/09/4/7080100/
Considering his limited powers and also 
his ambitions, Saakashvili is trying to 
build his position above all on the national 
and not the local political forum. 
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tential political project. Another manifestation 
of this activity was his struggle with the Dni-
propetrovsk-based oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi. 
This fits into the conflict between Poroshenko 
and Kolomoyskyi which has been ongoing for 
months, and is intended not only to strengthen 
the president but also Saakashvili’s own politi-
cal brand in Ukraine23.
Conclusions
The nomination of Mikheil Saakashvili for gov-
ernor of Odessa Oblast was intended as a sign 
that the region will become the ‘display win-
dow’ of Ukrainian reforms. However, it is pre-
cisely in Odessa where all the problems linked 
to the difficulty of reforming Ukraine are most 
visible. Mikheil Saakashvili has become a hos-
tage to local deals which remain strong despite 
the revolution. As a player from the outside, the 
former Georgian president is building his po-
sition in the region from scratch. Meanwhile, 
even the political base of the party he repre-
sents (Petro Poroshenko Bloc) often co-oper-
ates with representatives of the ancien regime. 
The only real form of pressure on administration 
structures and local interest groups available to 
him is his direct access to President Poroshenko, 
who is Saakashvili’s main ‘argument’. Actions 
taken by Saakashvili to make changes are char-
acterised mainly by numerous declarations and 
aggressive wording, followed by significantly 
less noticeable actions. This is an effect of both 
the chaotic nature of action taken by Saakash-
vili and the resistance he has encountered from 
administration. The governor is still depend-
ent on the central government’s decisions. 
23 The best-known example of such actions was Saakash-
vili’s conflict with the head of the National Aviation Ser-
vice, who allegedly lobbied for Ihor Kolomoyskyi’s inter-
ests in this area. The Port of Illichivsk, which is within 
Kolomoyskyi’s zone of influence, has become another 
field of struggle between him and Saakashvili – Saakash-
vili accused the port’s managers of mismanagement and 
discrimination in favour of the interests of private busi-
ness entities.
Therefore, to make multiple staff reshuffles 
at institutions, he must engage in a lengthy ne-
gotiation with Kyiv. 
In effect, Odessa is a model example of the 
systemic problems Ukraine is suffering from 
two years since the Revolution of Dignity. Loud 
declarations of changes, backed with PR cam-
paigns, have not translated into effective ac-
tion, since these have been blocked by strong 
local deals which are supported by central gov-
ernment structures which also benefit from 
corruption. Mikheil Saakashvili himself is also 
a controversial figure – being aware of the lim-
ited powers he is vested with, he is trying to 
play above all on the national level, neglect-
ing local affairs and surrounding himself with 
controversial sponsors. Accepting the existence 
of local deals and the slow tempo of changes 
in the region, he is still trying to maintain his 
image as a reformer, introducing changes only 
to the extent that the general situation allows 
him to and focusing above all on criticising his 
political opponents. In his speeches he open-
ly criticises Prime Minister Yatsenyuk and the 
government, attacks oligarchs and condemns 
corruption on the highest levels of the state 
administration. He remains loyal to President 
Poroshenko. However, the fact that the party’s 
central apparatus accepts actions taken by local 
PPB structures against the candidate designat-
ed by Saakashvili and their subsequent alliance 
with political projects originating from the for-
mer Party of Regions is proof of Saakashvili’s 
weakness, including inside his own political 
camp. Actions taken by Saakashvili since the 
end of 2015 (including convening three nation-
wide Anti-Corruption Forums which should be 
treated as a platform for a new political pro-
ject and the beginning of him building his own 
political base) suggest that his position as the 
governor of Odessa Oblast is just the starting 
point of his future career in Ukrainian politics. 
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Saakashvili’s ambitions extend far beyond the 
Odessa region, and his activity on the national 
forum has already borne its first fruit – accord-
ing to public opinion polls conducted in late 
January 2016 a possible political project led by 
him could garner support from around 12% 
of the electorate determined to vote24. It there-
fore seems reasonable to ask how long he will 
perform his present function.
24 Data quoted from the survey conducted by Rating group 
on 14-22 January 2015: http://ratinggroup.ua/research/
ukraine/elektoralnye_i_obschestvennye_nastroeniya_
naseleniya.html
Ukrainian maritime ports
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